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Abstract
This paper attempts to analyse the macroeconomic effects of unemployment benefits in a small open
economy. We adopt a Stock–Flow–Consistent (SFC) approach with an emphasis on the dynamics of
the labour market. We numerically solve the model using a combination of estimation and calibration
to generate statistics for our key variables, reflecting features of the Danish economy. We then analyse
the effects of a fall in the unemployment compensation rate on the economy. The results indicate
that a fall in the compensation rate at a macro level leads to a trade-off between a fall in aggregate
demand and a rise in net exports. Due to this trade-off, the net effect of a fall in the compensation
rate on the aggregate unemployment rate tends to be weak. Our analyses in this paper raise several
questions on the existing views regarding unemployment benefits adopted by a large strand of the
economic literature.
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1 Introduction
How do unemployment benefits (UB) affect the labour market and macroeconomic outcomes? A high
compensation rate on the one hand secures the unemployed against the loss of income, but on the other
hand, it is widely believed to negatively affect the incentive for the unemployed to work. The effects
of unemployment benefits on individual workers, the labour market, and the associated macroeconomic
outcomes are still some of the least understood issues.
The dominant narrative – which argues that increasing UB can increase unemployment – can be
theoretically explained from both the supply and demand perspectives. On the demand side, higher
benefits lead to a higher demand for real wages from workers, which can result in a lower level of de-
mand for labour from firms (Diamond, 1982; Shapiro/Stiglitz, 1984). On the supply side, higher benefits
imply that the unemployed sacrifice a smaller part of their future consumption, which can generate a
disincentive effect in the labour market (Baily, 1978; Hopenhayn/Nicolini, 1997). However, the empirical
evidence regarding the relationship between UB and the level of unemployment is inconclusive. Some
studies have found a positive correlation between UB and unemployment (e.g, Meyer (1990); Scarpetta
(1996)), while other studies have questioned the existence of any significant correlation (e.g, (Naren-
dranathan/Stewart, 1993; Howell/Rehm, 2009; Howell/Azizoglu, 2011)). In general, the relationship –
if existing at all – has been found to be very weak in most cases (see, Atkinson/Micklewright (1991),
for a survey). In addition, quantifying the effects of UB on macroeconomic outcomes is challenging,
as described in Chodorow-Reich/Karabarbounis (2016), and the empirical mishandling of the issue is
highlighted in several studies.
The literature on UB has mostly focused on the effects related to consumption and worker-behaviour
towards the job market, at a micro level or by considering the labour market in isolation. A few recent
studies, notably Krusell et al. (2010); Nakajima (2012); Mitman/Rabinovich (2015); Kekre (2016) have
addressed macroeconomic effects of UB, incorporating labour market frictions. These studies, while
adopting the views put forward in classical search and matching theory, have reached very different
conclusions. Consequently, the macroeconomic outcomes linked to unemployment benefits still remains
unclear. Theoretically, the macroeconomic effects associated with UB could greatly differ from those
highlighted in micro studies and in models of the labour market. Unemployment benefits not only
have direct effects on consumption at an individual level but also on wage setting, welfare, and aggregate
demand at a macro level. These macro effects in turn can have significant feedback–effects on employment
and the balance of payments of a small open economy.
The negative views regarding the effects of unemployment compensation on the economy have greatly
influenced policy choices in Denmark. Over the last few decades, unemployment compensation rates3
have been reduced, as confirmed by Danish Economic Councils (DØRS).4 In the beginning of the 1980s,
the rate at which the unemployed were compensated for the loss of income was set at 65% of the average
wage in the industry. The compensation rate declined to less than 50% by 2015 (DØRS, 2014; Cevea,
2015). In particular, the recent decline in unemployment compensation is clearly linked to changes in
labour market policy during this period.
This paper attempts to analyse the macroeconomic effects of unemployment benefits in a small open
economy like Denmark. We adopt a Stock–Flow–Consistent (SFC) approach with an emphasis on the
dynamics of the labour market. Our paper makes three important contributions. First, we develop a
SFC model by integrating the dynamics of a labour market in a small open economy framework. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first paper addressing the issue of unemployment benefits at a macro
level, using a SFC framework. Second, we critically analyse the proposals calling for a reduction in
unemployment benefits as an appropriate policy to reduce unemployment. Third, our paper contributes
to the ongoing debate on the possible effects of unemployment benefits on the level of unemployment, and
macroeconomic outcomes. This paper raises several questions about the existing views on unemployment
benefits adopted by a large strand of the economic literature.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature on the subject, highlighting
some prominent contributions as well as discussing post-Keynesian views on the issue. Section 3 explains
some core features of the Danish labour market along with its system of unemployment benefits. Section
4 proposes a SFC macroeconomic model of unemployment benefits. Section 5 numerically solves the
3Note: while unemployment benefits have increased in levels, the gap between benefits and salaries has widened over
the last few years, i.e., the compensation rates have fallen.
4Danish Economic Councils referred to as De Økonomiske R̊ad Sekretariat(DØRS).
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model and introduces three main scenarios, followed by a discussion of the simulation results. Section 6
concludes this paper.
2 Literature Review
There is an extensive literature on the effects of unemployment benefits on the labour market. Most of
the literature on the link between compensation rates and employment is based on the classical search
theory (see Rogerson et al. (2005) for a survey).5 In general, a change in the unemployment benefits
in these models has an effect on a worker’s reservation wage and thereby whether a given job–offer is
accepted; a reduction in the unemployment benefits therefore leads to a reduction in the reservation wage,
which can result in a shorter duration of unemployment (Rosholm, 2006). While addressing the issue,
a large strand of theoretical literature has focused on the trade–off between consumption–smoothing
and moral hazard effects of unemployment benefits (e.g., Baily (1978); Flemming (1978); Shavell/Weiss
(1979); Hopenhayn/Nicolini (1997); Chetty (2006)).6
On the empirical front, several studies have tested these theories by investigating the correlation
between incentives to work and job–search behaviour mainly using administrative data (see, e.g., Meyer
(1990) and Katz/Meyer (1990)). A number of empirical studies in this area are reviewed by Andersen
et al. (2015). Overall, the results in these studies indicate partial evidence, that higher unemployment
benefits are associated with lower traffic from unemployed to employed. The findings in some stud-
ies reject the existence of any significant correlation between unemployment benefits and the level of
unemployment as described in Howell/Rehm (2009). On the contrary, the evidence in Howell/Rehm
(2009) indicates that the causality could run in the opposite direction, i.e., a change in unemployment
may have the effect of changing unemployment benefits. The link between unemployment benefits and
work incentives is also discussed in (Howell/Azizoglu, 2011). Their results indicate that the link between
benefits and work incentives may not be as strong as widely believed.7 The authors argue that
“...the evidence overwhelmingly shows that in the real world holding a job is typically highly
valued independently of the income it generates, and if it is so, changes in UI [unemployment
insurance] generosity may have nothing to do with changes in the disutility of work”.
Not only is there a question of causality between unemployment benefits and unemployment in
empirical studies, but even the theoretical link between the two factors seems to lack coherence in
the literature. The simplistic views, regarding the relationship between unemployment benefits and
unemployment, adopted by a large strand of literature are critically discussed in Atkinson/Micklewright
(1991).
In general, the critics of a higher UB have usually pointed to the adverse effects by highlighting
the disincentive effect it might induce in the labour market. In contrast, the proponents of UB have
focused on the potential benefits by considering the consumption–smoothing effects (see, e.g., Gruber
(1997)). Some authors have also focused on the welfare and macroeconomic effects of UB. For example,
Acemoglu/Shimer (2000) argued that in a less generous welfare system, workers tend to accept low pro-
ductivity jobs to avoid unemployment, which in turn can have adverse effects on output and welfare. On
the other hand, a more generous benefit system allows the workers to bear the risk of being unemployed
and search for jobs with higher productivity, which can increase welfare and output.
In contrast to the mainstream theory, the post-Keynesian literature on the labour market clearly
distinguishes the characteristics of a labour market from the goods market.8 At an aggregate level, the
level of employment and real wages are determined by effective demand and pricing policies (Davidson,
1998); (Arestis/Sawyer, 2013, p.311); (Lavoie, 2014, p.277). This implies that an increase in aggregate
demand will raise the level of economic activity, creating more jobs.
5Earlier surveys on search theory in the labour markets can be found in Lippman/McCall (1976), Mortensen (1986),
and Mortensen/Pissarides (1999).
6The famous Baily-Chetty formula in public finance determines the optimum level of UI by resolving this trade-off.
Chetty (2008) derives a formula to determine the optimal level of UI by incorporating liquidity effects in the model.
7In contrast to the standard utility assumption, Rätzel (2009) finds a positive relationship between work and happiness.
8The level of employment in basic neoclassical models is established in the labour market, and then enters the production
function. The wage in the model is seen as a price of labour. This treatment of the labour market is comparable to the
goods market.
2
Focusing on the effects of unemployment benefits, the post-Keynesian theory implies that an increase
in unemployment benefits, if not reducing unemployment, may prevent a rise in unemployment via
aggregate demand effects. However, the direct effects of unemployment benefits on the supply of labour
are not obvious. Regarding the supply of labour, it has been argued that the decision to work along with
conventional variables - such as wage rates - also depends on a number of factors, including norms, wages
relative to other workers, consumption levels, and the standard of living. This implies that an increase
in unemployment benefits may not force people to leave their jobs or stay unemployed for longer periods.
In addition, there is no specific post-Keynesian view of the labour market at a micro level as highlighted
by (Lavoie, 2014, p.277), however, the author argues that post-Keynesians in this regard may agree with
the ideas of Institutionalist labour economists or industrial relations labour economists.9
In general, post-Keynesians have proposed redistributive policies, favouring an increase in social ex-
penditures – including unemployment benefits – which are important for income distribution. In particu-
lar, two main distributive policies – namely pro-labour and pro-capital – are described by Lavoie/Stockhammer
(2013). The objective of a pro-labour policy is to strengthen the welfare state, labour market institu-
tions, labour unions, and the ability to engage in collective bargaining. An active pro-labour policy at an
aggregate level may result in stable or increasing wage shares. An increase in unemployment benefits is
therefore part of a pro-labour policy. A pro-capital policy on the other hand has the target of increasing
labour market flexibility and weakening the bargaining power of the union, which may result in falling
wage shares.10
The outcome of these policies, however, depends upon the growth regime of a country as discussed
in Lavoie/Stockhammer (2013), i.e., whether an economy is wage-led or profit-led plays a central role in
this debate.11 A pro-capital policy in a profit-led growth regime will lead to a higher level of aggregate
demand, which is likely to have positive effects on output and employment. On the other hand, a pro-
capital policy in a wage-led growth regime, will lead to a fall in aggregate demand, which is likely to
have adverse effects on output and employment, unless such effects are offset by other factors, such as
technological shocks, export growth or private debt, which can stimulate economic growth.
3 A System of Unemployment benefits
We now turn to explaining some core features of the Danish labour market along with its system of
unemployment benefits. The aim of the unemployment benefits system is to provide a security net by
compensating workers in the event of a loss of income due to unemployment, i.e., the system reduces
the risks associated with unemployment. This generous system has been an important component of the
well–known Flexicurity system. This system is famous for the combination of flexibility in the labour
market, security for the single worker, and an active labour market policy (Bredgaard et al., 2011). This
trinity is known as the golden triangle, which can be visually represented as follows:
Flexibility Security
ActivePolicy
9Some of the economists of the 1950s mentioned by (Lavoie, 2014, p.277) include John Dunlop, Clark Kerr and Richard
Lester, whereas as some of the recent ones include, Lester Thurow, Michael Piore, Peter Doeringer, Barry Bluestone, David
Howell and Frank Wilkinson.
10Due to pro-capital policies, most advanced economies – including Denmark – have experienced a decline in wage shares
over the last few decades, which is well-documented in the post-Keynesian literature on financialisation.
11An economy is wage-led if an increase in the profit share leads to a fall in the overall private aggregated demand (Hein
2014, 263). However, an economy can also be characterized as profit-led if an increase in the profit share is associated with
an increase in aggregate demand. This issue has received considerable attention in recent post-Keynesian literature (see,
e.g., Onaran et al. (2011); Stockhammer (2013); Onaran/Galanis (2013)).
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From the perspective of the employer, the model is attractive because, i) it involves low employment
protection, and ii) the employers do not have to guarantee the income of workers if they decide to fire
them. The labour unions accept this, despite the risk of being fired, because of the social security net,
which provides high compensation for the loss of income (Bredgaard et al., 2011). The last corner of
the triangle represents an active labour market policy, which is executed at a municipality level. This
policy pursues the objective of putting unemployed individuals back to work, or to improve and upgrade
their skills – e.g., through education (Madsen, 2011) – in order to prepare them for new employment
opportunities. Together, the forces in this golden triangle have the purpose of increasing the dynamics
of the labour market, resulting in low rates of unemployment.
Despite the success of the flexicurity model, the security for workers – measured by both unemploy-
ment benefits (compensation rate) and the duration of benefits – has significantly declined over the last
few decades. The average compensation rate, where the average unemployment benefit is compared
to the average salary in the industry sector for the period 1980 to 2014, shows a significant decrease
as can be seen in Figure 1 below. Figure 1 shows the co-movement between unemployment rate and
expenditures on unemployment benefits as a percentage of GDP in Denmark. It can be seen that UB
expenditures to GDP automatically increases (decreases) in response to a rise (fall) in unemployment
rates.
Figure 1
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The Danish parliament in 2010 implemented certain reforms targeting the system of unemployment
benefits, which had two notable constituents: i) the duration of unemployment benefits was reduced from
48 months to 24 months, and ii) eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits were increased from
6 months to 12 months of full–time employment. The purpose of the reform was to increase employment
and reduce government spending in order to improve the government’s budget (DØRS, 2014, p, 159).
In 2014, a commission was charged with the task of investigating how to make the existing system
of unemployment benefits contemporary to the modern labour market. The recommendations from the
labour market commission argued that the incentive to work must be increased by reducing unemploy-
ment benefits. A decline in the compensation rate, a tightening of the eligibility requirements, and
a reduction in the duration of unemployment benefits – all of which were backed by the recommen-
dations from the commission – clearly indicate a tightening of the unemployment benefits system in
Denmark. The security side of the golden triangle is therefore continuously deteriorating, which erodes
the foundation of the flexicurity model (Madsen, 2011, 2015).
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4 Model
In order to understand the macroeconomic effects linked to unemployment benefits in a small open
economy, we develop a simple dynamic SFC model following the approach of Godley/Lavoie (2012).12
Although there are many ways to address this issue, a SFC model incorporates many of the holistic
modelling capabilities of other macroeconomic models. In addition, the SFC framework is the most
appropriate to analyse the macroeconomic effects of UB from a post-Keynesian perspective.13 Post-
Keynesian views on the labour market can be coherently integrated with the goods and financial markets
in a SFC framework, as will be discussed.
Since the core objective of the model is to address the issue of UB, we integrate labour market
dynamics in an open economy with limited financial activities. The economy is divided into five key
sectors: Households, Firms, Government, the Central Bank, and the rest of the world. The model will
be explained in two key steps as follows: First, we will explain all the transactions taking place in the
economy. Alongside which, we will also discuss the type of assets traded in the economy. Second, we will
explain the structure of the model while focusing on the key equations regarding UB in the economy.
4.1 Transaction flow and balance sheet matrices
The transaction flow matrix is presented in Table 1. The production in the economy takes place in
the firms, which is represented as a standard expenditure approach to GDP in the national accounts.
The firms hire workers (household) and pay them wages. They also pay taxes to the government, and
trade with the rest of the world. Following the approach of Dos Santos/Zezza (2008), we assume firms
have a fixed equity to capital ratio. They issue new equities whenever they decide to increase their
capital.14 Firms make profits, a proportion of which is retained to finance investment expenditures and
hold currency as an asset.15
Households at an aggregate level finance their consumption through wages, unemployment benefits,
and income on their asset holdings. Households hold three assets, namely government bills, domestic
currency, and equities. They also pay income taxes to the government.
The government expenditures consist of two main components, i) government spending (G), and ii)
unemployment benefits UB transferred to the unemployed households. These expenditures are financed
through taxes (received from households and firms) and bills. The central bank in the model acts as a
clearing sector, i.e., it fulfils the demand for local currency, and also holds any outstanding government
bills in the economy. It also accumulates foreign currency reserves to ensure a fixed exchange rate.
Finally, the last column representing the interaction of the small economy with the rest of the world
fulfils the balance of payments identities, i.e., a surplus (deficit) on the current account equals a deficit
(surplus) on the financial account.
12Also known as the post-Keynesian SFC model. For a survey on the SFC approach to modelling, see Caverzasi/Godin
(2014); Nikiforos/Zezza (2017).
13We prefer to use a SFC approach because it deviates from the approach based on the utility maximisation problem of
the workers, widely adopted in public finance and mainstream macroeconomics, i.e., the decision to work in this framework
negatively affects utility. As discussed earlier, post-Keynesian views on the labour market differ from those in public finance
and mainstream macroeconomics.
14The stock of capital does not grow over time in the steady state, therefore the change in equities (i.e., the emission of
new equities) is zero, and investment is financed by a proportion of retained profits. As a simplifying assumption the firms
issue equities irrespective of the cost, and any existing stock of equities is held by the household sector in the model. The
rest of the portfolio choice of the households follows a standard portfolio allocation as in Godley/Lavoie (2012). Moreover,
there are no capital gains as the price of equities is fixed.
15The holding of currency by the firms should be seen as an accounting identity from the perspective of the balance of
payments, i.e., the current account (trade) balance is equal to the financial (capital) account.
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Table 1: Transaction Flow Matrix (TFM)
Small Economy ROW
Flows Households Firms Govt Central Bank
current capital
Consumption −C +C
Investment +I −I
Gov. exp +G −G
Exports +X −X
Imports −M +M
Wages +WB −WB
Tax −Th −T f +T
Unemployment Benefits +UB −UB
Interest on bills +rt−1.Bht−1 −rt−1.BSt−1 +rt−1.Bcbt−1
Profits (Firms) +Fh −F +Ff
Profits (Central bank) +rt−1.Bcbt−1 −rt−1.Bcbt−1
Change in bills −∆Bh +∆BS −∆Bcb
Change in equities −∆ed.P e +∆es.P e
Change in domestic currency −∆Hh −∆Hf +∆HS
Change in foreign currency −∆Fx.XR +∆Fx.XR
0 0 0 0 0 0
The balance sheet matrix is presented in Table 2. A plus (+) sign indicates an asset, while a minus
(-) sign represents a liability.
Table 2: Balance sheet matrix
Small Economy ROW
Assets Households Firms Govt Central Bank
∑
Bills +Bh −BS +Bcb 0
Equities +es.P e −e.P e 0
Domestic currency +Hh +Hf −HS 0
Foreign currency +Fx.XR −Fx.XR 0
Fixed capital +K +K
Net worth Vh Vf Vg Vcb
4.2 Structure of the model
The overall structure of the model is a combination of standard accounting identities and the behavioural
equations.16 The aggregate income of the household sector is an accounting identity, which can be
determined as follows,
Y Dt = WBt + rt−1.B
h
t−1 + Fh + UB − Tht (1)
where Y Dt is the disposable income, WBt represents the wage bill, rt is the interest received by the
household sector on its assets Bht (government bill), Fh represents the distributed profits, UB is the
unemployment benefits, and Tht is the income tax paid by the household sector.
Following the standard post–Keynesian consumption function as generally used in SFC frameworks,17
the household sector consumes a portion of their disposable income and a fraction of their wealth. The
consumption function can be represented as follows,
ct = α1.ydt + α2.vt−1 (2)
where ct
18 represents aggregate real consumption, α1 is the parameter which represents the propensity
16The complete model along with the parameter values can be seen in the appendix.
17See, Godley/Lavoie (2012) for a detailed discussion and motivation of several behavioural equations not discussed in
this paper due to space and time.
18Note that variables represented by small letters represent real values whereas the ones written in capital letters represent
nominal values.
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to consume out of real disposable income ydt, while α2 represents the propensity to consume out of real
wealth vt−1.
Production of goods takes place in the firms sector. The decision to invest is determined in a standard
way, following the partial adjustment accelerator model as shown below,
it = γ.(k
T − kt−1) + da (3)
Equation 3 simply states that real investment it is determined by a partial adjustment γ of the
existing stock of capital kt−1 towards a desired stock of capital k
T , plus a level of depreciation DA. The
targeted capital (or desired stock of capital) is determined by a previous level of real sales (see equation
28 in the appendix).
Prices P st are set as a mark–up φ over unit cost measured as the sum of wage–bill WBt and imports
Mt, divided by real sales of goods st.
P st = (1 + φ).UCt (4)
UCt = (WBt +Mt)/st (5)
The level of employment is determined in the goods market, where firms will hire as many workers
as needed to fulfil the demand for goods.19 The total cost of labour for the firms, as represented by the
wage bill WBt, can therefore be written as,
WBt = Wt.Nt (6)
where Nt represents the number of workers hired by the firms and Wt represents nominal wages paid to
the workers. The difference between the labour force Lf and the number of employed equals the number
of unemployed individuals. The rate of unemployment can be expressed as follows,
URt = 1 −
Nt
Lf
(7)
Labour force Lf is determined by the labour participation rate of the total population, represented as
follows,
Lf = act.Pop (8)
The participation rate (act) in the model is determined by real wages and the employment rate. This
setting for the Danish labour market is consistent with Statistics Denmark, ADAM (2003), as well as
Godin (2014) in the SFC context.20 If real wages rise, the participation rate is expected to be higher, as
individuals will search for jobs to increase their incomes, and become part of the labour force. If the rate
of employment increases, the participation rate is expected to rise as more and more individuals enter
the labour force. The equation can be represented as follows,
ln(act) = Φ0 + Φ1.ln(wt) + Φ2.ln(ERt−1) (9)
The level of unemployment benefits (UB) paid to the unemployed households is represented as follows,
UBt = ξ.Wt.UNt 0 < ξ < 1 (10)
where ξ is the compensation rate in the model, which is exogenously determined by the government.
For the unemployed, the UB represent present income, thus they prefer the compensation rate to be
higher. In addition, the employed also have an interest in a high compensation rate in case of a sudden
redundancy.
Workers have some real wage aspirations, represented by the target real wage w∗, which is influenced
by the compensation rate (ξ), the rate of employment (ER), and productivity (A) as shown in equation
11 below.21
ln(w∗t ) = β0 + β1.ln(At) + β2.ln(ξ) + β3.ln(ERt) (11)
19In particular, the demand for labour is determined by real output over labour productivity as shown in equation 53, i.e.,
the firms produce a certain level of output by hiring workers with a given level of labour productivity, which is exogenously
determined in our model.
20Annual Danish Aggregated Model (ADAM) is the official model used by Statistics Denmark and Ministry of Finance
in Denmark.
21β0 is the autonomous component of wages, while the rest of the parameters in the equation represent elasticities.
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This setting is similar to the wage equation in the benchmark model of Godley/Lavoie (2012) where
the targeted real wage is a function of employment and productivity. However, our decision to incorporate
the compensation rate in this equation is in line with standard models of ‘wage setting’, which argue
that the compensation rate plays an important role in the determination of target real wages (see,
e.g., (McDonald/Solow, 1981); (Shapiro/Stiglitz, 1984); (Sørensen/Whitta-Jacobsen, 2005, pp.526–527)).
According to this argument, if the compensation rate goes up - for example, as a result of a more generous
welfare system - workers will demand an increase in wages to maintain their incentive to work as against
being unemployed.
Firms, in contrast to the higher demand for wages from workers, would prefer to pay lower wages
in order to reduce costs. Therefore, a change in wages is the outcome of a bargain between the labour
union and the firms which can be represented as follows,
∆Wt = Ω0.(w
∗
t−1 − wt−1) (12)
The term Wt/P
ds
t represents real wages, while Ω0 is the parameter of wage adjustment, which also
represents the bargaining power of the union.22 Thus in the case of firms, the compensation rate has
a dual effect in the model; a high compensation rate may stimulate demand at an aggregate level (see
equations 1 and 2), but at the same time a high rate may affect wage negotiations and thereby the unit
cost of an individual firm (see equation 5).
In an open economy, a rise in the unit cost of firms due to an increase in wages will also affect their
international competitiveness as can be shown in equations 13 and 14.
ln(mt) = µ0 − µ1.ln
(
Pmt−1
P yt−1
)
+ µ2.ln(yt) (13)
ln(xt) = ε0 − ε1.ln
(
P xt−1
P y
∗
t−1
)
+ ε2.ln(y
∗
t ) (14)
where µ0 and ε0 represent autonomous components of the trade flows. µ1 and ε1 represent price elasticities
of imports and exports, respectively. For example, if domestic prices P yt increase relative to import
prices Pmt , the country will experience reduced competitiveness, resulting in higher imports mt and
lower exports xt. Similarly, if prices in the rest of the world P
y∗
t increase relative to export prices of
the domestic economy P xt , the competitiveness of the country will increase. The parameters µ2 and ε2
show the income elasticities of imports and exports, respectively. For example, if domestic income yt
increases, imports will increase. Likewise, an increase in foreign income y∗t will increase exports. In our
trade equations, we rely on a small economy assumption, i.e., economic activity in the small economy has
a negligible impact on the rest of the world. Hence, the prices P y
∗
and output y∗ abroad are exogenously
determined in the model.
Equation 15 and 16 explain the prices of tradables from the perspective of our domestic economy.
ln(Pmt ) = νm0 + νm1 .ln(P
y∗
t ) + (1 − νm1).ln(P
y
t ) + νm1 .ln(xr) (15)
ln(P xt ) = νx0 + νx1 .ln(P
y∗
t ) + (1 − νx1).ln(P
y
t ) + νx1 .ln(xr) (16)
Trade prices are affected by domestic prices, foreign prices and the exchange rate. The setting of
the parameters implement some logical constraints on price movements of tradables. The model implies
that, given a fixed exchange rate, a simultaneous increase in inflation of equal magnitude in the domestic
economy and abroad will have the same effect on import and export prices, i.e., the terms of trade will
not be affected. This is ensured by setting the sum of the coefficients on domestic (P yt ) and foreign
(P y
∗
t ) prices equal to unity. However, based on the well–established empirical fact, the parameter (νm1)
in the imports equation is greater than the parameter (νx1) in the exports equation. This implies that
following a devaluation, the prices of both exports and imports will increase, but the terms of trade will
fall due to a stronger increase in import prices, resulting in a positive effect on net exports. The above
pricing equations, along with the specified constraints, have been used by a number of authors in the
22It should be highlighted that this parameter reflects the bargaining power of the union for an increase in wages only,
i.e., a union with stronger bargaining power will be faster in reinforcing higher wages, whereas it may be slow in reinforcing
lower wages.
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SFC framework for open economies, such as Lavoie/Daigle (2011), Mazier/Tiou-Tagba Aliti (2012), and
Greenwood-Nimmo (2013).
The government wants to reduce its expenditures but at the same time, it needs to fulfil its respon-
sibility in the welfare state by paying UB to unemployed households. The government in the model
finances its expenses by issuing bills as follows,
∆BSt = Gt + UBt + rt−1.BSt−1 − Tt − rt−1.Bcbt−1 (17)
where BSt represents the total supply of bills, Gt represents government consumption, Tt represents total
tax receipts, and Bcbt represents the interest payments by the Central bank on government bill holdings.
Before presenting the results of the model, we briefly discuss the process of calibration involved in
solving the model with a focus on our key parameters. In setting the parameter values, our first priority
is to rely on estimations reported for the Danish data by previous studies. However, in cases where
estimations for the Danish data are not available, we rely on values tested to have generated stylised
facts in previous SFC models.
5 Simulations
The parameters of the model are assigned values using a combination of estimation and calibration with
the aim of generating statistics for our key variables, reflecting features of the Danish economy. Focusing
on the key parameters, the compensation rate in our model is set to ξ = 0.55, which is similar to the
value mentioned in Cevea (2015) and DØRS (2014). The compensation rate affects wages indirectly
through targeted wages, whereas the direct effect of compensation rates on the targeted wage is set to
β2 = 0.1.
23 In the wage setting, the effect of employment rates on the targeted wage is set to β3 = 0.75
in our model. Our decision to assign a value to β3 in the wage-setting is consistent with the existing
literature on wage curves, for which there is enough empirical evidence in several small economies.24
However, we will later show the response of the model when this parameter approaches the value of zero.
The labour participation rate is estimated using OLS regression, where the coefficients (Φ1) and (Φ2)
are estimated to be 0.05 and 0.23, respectively.25 Our model replicates the participation rate in Denmark,
which is roughly 0.75, as reported by Statistics Denmark. The expenditures on unemployment benefits
as a percentage of GDP is 2.5, which is almost equal to the mean of expenditures on unemployment
benefits (as a percentage of GDP) during 1995 – 2015. The parameters in the consumption function
α1 = 0.9 and α2 = 0.1 are set accordingly to the results reported by Danmarks Nationalbank (2013).
The price and income elasticities of the trade equations are based on the estimations for Denmark in
ADAM (2013). The parameter on productivity – consistent with previous calibrated SFC models – is
set to β1 = 1. Other parameters appearing in the investment function and the price equations of the
model are assigned values based on the analyses in previous SFC models, i.e., these values fall within
the range widely used in the SFC modelling tradition for open economies, such as Lavoie/Daigle (2011),
Godley/Lavoie (2012), Mazier/Tiou-Tagba Aliti (2012), and Greenwood-Nimmo (2013).
We create a very open wage-led economy with a trade openness of 90% of GDP, which is somewhat
similar to the Danish economy where trade openness has fluctuated between 90–100% of GDP over the
last two decades. The economy in our model maintains a fixed exchange rate, as is the case in Denmark.
We generate an unemployment rate of 5.6%, which is very close to the mean of unemployment rates over
the last two decades. Since the model is a large non-linear system of equations the model is simulated
by using Eviews, where a solution to the system of equations is found.26 However, this solution may not
23While the transmission channel of compensation rates differs in the Annual Danish Aggregated Model (ADAM, 2013),
the effect of compensation on wages in the end is almost similar in magnitude to our setting.
24See, Blanchflower/Oswald (2005) for empirical evidence on the existence of the wage curve in more than 40 countries.
Also, see, Nijkamp/Poot (2005), for a meta–analysis on this relationship.
25Based on the availability of data, the model is estimated using annual data for the period 1984 to 2015.
26The system of equations can be divided into three blocks of equations, where block 1 and 3 could be solved recursively,
while block 2 must be solved simultaneously. To solve the system of equations in block 2 the Newton-method is used. The
Newton method is an iteration algorithm, where a linear approximation around a specific set of values for the vectors of
endogenous and exogenous variables is used to build an iteration process. An initial guess to solve the system begins the
iteration process, which stops, when the changes in values of the vector with endogenous variables are below a pre-specified
level of tolerance, which in this simulation is set to 1e-8. For further details on nonlinear solutions in eviews, see the users
manual: http://www.eviews.com/help/helpintro.html#page/content%2Fpreface.html%23.
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be a unique one since the existence of multiple solutions is a possibility. In case of multiple solutions,
the chosen initial values restrict the achieved solution to be a local solution within a chosen domain27
– a solution procedure that this study has in common with several other nonlinear SFC models, such
as Lavoie/Daigle (2011); Greenwood-Nimmo (2013). Consistent with the standard practice in numerical
SFC models, we first simulate the model to achieve a baseline steady state. We create three scenarios
in the model as follows, i) reduce the compensation rate, ii) introduce downward real wage rigidity, and
iii) decrease the effect of employment on targeted wages.
5.1 The effects of a lower compensation rate
We now turn to addressing the core question raised in this paper, i.e., what are the macroeconomic effects
of unemployment benefits in a small open economy? To address this question, we generate a scenario in
the model by reducing the compensation rate ξ from 0.55 to 0.5.
Focusing on the macroeconomic effects, a reduction in the compensation rate affects the economy
in two ways. First, a decrease in the compensation rate directly affects the income of unemployed
individuals, which can result in a demand compression. Second, reducing the compensation rate puts
downward pressure on wages, which will increase international competitiveness via the price channel,
and the economy can experience export–led growth. The latter argument is also used as a justification
for a lower compensation rate.
Figure 2 shows unemployment benefits as a percentage of GDP;28 it can be seen that a fall in the
compensation rate leads to lower expenditures on UB, as expected. Figure 3 shows the effect of a
lower compensation rate on the rate of unemployment in our model. In the short run, a negative shock
to the compensation rate initially increases the unemployment rate, as the income of the unemployed
labour force falls, resulting in a demand compression. The unemployment rate then falls as the effects
of increased competitiveness – as a result of lower wages – dominate the effect of a demand compression.
A decline in the terms of trade (or an increase in competitiveness) generates a current account surplus
as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 2
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27The values of exogenous variables can be found in the Appendix. The model code is available upon request.
28Note that the y-axis on GDP and domestic demand represents real values, obtained from the simulated model. All
graphs with the exception of the unemployment rate are represented as a percentage of GDP. The unemployment rate is
expressed as a proportion of the labour force as defined in equation 7.
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In the long run, the model stabilises at an unemployment rate slightly higher than the baseline
scenario. This adjustment in the long run is due to a decline in competitiveness over time, stemming
from the wage–curve effect, i.e., a reduction in the unemployment rate increases the targeted wages in
the model.
5.2 Introducing downward real wage resistance
In our baseline model, the effect of the compensation rate on real wages is symmetric, i.e., the response
of real wages to both negative and positive shocks is similar in magnitude. Thus, we did not restrict
a negative compensation rate shock to have a significant downward pressure on real wages. However,
there is now ample empirical evidence for the existence of downward wage rigidity, especially in advanced
countries with strong labour unions.29 The labour union resistance to a decline in wages in the bargain-
ing process has now become an essential component of macroeconomic models.30 From a behavioural
perspective, as described by Kahneman/Tversky (1979), individuals are more reluctant to losses than
they are attracted to the gains of similar magnitude.
The above discussion leads to another key question, what are the effects of unemployment benefits in
a small open economy when there is a strong resistance to reductions in real wages? In order to address
this issue, we adjust our model by decreasing the effect of the compensation rate on targeted wages; we
reduce the value of β2 from 0.1 to 0.05. It is important to highlight that after reducing the effects of
the compensation rate on targeted real wages, we still generate the same baseline scenario as previously
discussed.31 After achieving the baseline scenario, we introduce a compensation rate shock by reducing
the value of ξ from 0.55 to 0.50, as was done in scenario 1 discussed above.
29See, e.g., Agell/Lundborg (2003); Christofides/Li (2005); Holden/Wulfsberg (2009)
30see, e.g., Blanchard/Gaĺı (2007); Hall (2005)
31We generate the same baseline scenario by re-adjusting the autonomous component (β0) in equation 11. The purpose
of maintaining the same baseline scenario is to consistently compare different scenarios.
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Looking at the figures above, the results are not surprising. A decrease in the compensation rate
in an environment of downward real wage rigidity leads to a higher unemployment rate as compared to
the baseline scenario. In the short run, the unemployment rate immediately increases due to a fall in
aggregate demand. The unemployment rate then drops due to an increase in the level of competitiveness.
However, the fall in the unemployment rate is much lower than in scenario 1. The difference between
scenario 1 and scenario 2 is straightforward: a reduction in the compensation rate now has a lower
impact on the relative prices (or the level of competitiveness), as targeted wages are resistant to falls.
The diminished effect of competitiveness in the economy can be seen in a relatively lower current account
surplus as compared to scenario 1. In the long run, the model stabilises, reaching an unemployment rate
higher than in the case of scenario 1, where real wages were relatively more flexible. The adjustment
mechanism of the model towards a new steady state remains the same as in scenario 1.
5.3 Decreasing the effect of employment on wages
In the baseline model, a change in the rate of unemployment affects the targeted real wages. This as
discussed earlier can be seen as an argument for the existence of a wage Phillips–curve. However, in
a number of studies, including Godley/Lavoie (2012), Hein/Stockhammer (2011) and Lavoie (2014), a
Phillips–curve with a horizontal part is proposed. In these studies, it has been argued that fluctuations in
the employment rate within certain bands (i.e., smaller changes in the employment rate) do not affect the
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targeted real wages. We introduce this feature in our model by lowering the elasticity of the employment
rate (β3) to the targeted real wage. In this scenario, the effects of a change in the compensation rate ξ
are analysed within an environment of a relatively flatter Phillips–curve. Like in section 5.2, this is done
by first creating the baseline scenario (after changing the value of β3 from 0.75 to 0.5) and thereafter
reducing the value of ξ from 0.55 to 0.5.
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The result of this simulation looks quite similar to the results from the first scenario. In the short
run, the reduction in the compensation rate lowers the income of the households, and thereby lowers the
domestic demand. This fall in aggregate demand results in an increase in the rate of unemployment.
In the medium term, however, the effect of increased competitiveness starts to dominate the con-
traction of domestic demand. This increases competitiveness as can be seen by the positive current
account balance as shown in Figure 13. The dynamics seem to be identical to scenario 1, but with some
important distinctions: the effects of a lower compensation rate on the unemployment rate are slightly
stronger in the long run as compared to scenario 1. This is due to a stronger fall in domestic demand
and a relatively weaker response of the current account. In the current scenario, the effect of a change
in the employment rate on real wages is set to be weaker. Therefore when the employment rate falls
as a result of a fall in domestic demand, real wages do not fall as much as in scenario 1, resulting in a
relatively weaker effect on the level of competitiveness.
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5.4 Robustness
We perform several robustness tests by changing the values of parameters. After changing the parameters,
we introduce the same three scenarios – as discussed earlier – and simulate the model. The new results
are compared with those of the main model, referred to as the ‘benchmark model’.
Our first experiment involves changing the key parameters in the trade equations. Overall, the pa-
rameter values in the trade equations are increased, which implies that the tradables are more sensitive to
price movements and incomes variations.32 We assign values to these parameters based on the empirical
results reported for sensitive goods, i.e., the goods with the highest elasticities in the trade sector. In
particular, ε2 in the export equation is increased from 0.62 to 1, which is close to the elasticity reported
for tourism and manufactured goods in the Danish export sector. The price elasticity of exports ε1 is
increased from 1.6 to 2, which is the elasticity of manufactured goods. At the same time, the price
elasticity of imports µ1 is increased from 0.4 to 1, which is close to the elasticity of primary goods. The
income elasticity of imports µ2 is increased from 1.11 to 1.47, which is close to the elasticity reported for
manufactured goods.
Given that the demand for tradables is sensitive to price and income variations, a fall in the com-
pensation rate would result in lower unemployment in the short run as compared to the benchmark
model. This is due to the strong effect of relative prices on net exports, increasing output and reducing
the unemployment rate as shown in Figure 14 and 15, respectively. However, the unemployment rate
increases in the long run due to stronger feedback effects of income on imports. In the long run, the
results for the three scenarios are quite similar across the two models.
Figure 14: Unemployment rate
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Figure 15: GDP
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In addition, we perform a separate experiment in which we perform sensitivity checks on the equations
involving the determinants of prices of imports and exports. In particular, we make the import prices
more responsive to the developments in foreign prices and less responsive to domestic prices by increasing
the value of νm1 from 0.7 to 0.8. At the same time, we make export prices less sensitive to foreign prices
and more sensitive to domestic prices by reducing the value of νx1 from 0.4 to 0.2. These changes lead
to a negligible impact on the overall model, as can be seen in Figure 16 and 17.
32Note that the parameters involved in this experiment are changed simultaneously.
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Figure 16: Unemployment rate
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Figure 17: GDP
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Second, we test the sensitivity of the model by changing a strategic parameter in the wage-setting
equations, i.e., we change the speed of real wage adjustment (Ω0) towards its targeted level. We perform
two separate experiments in which we first reduce the value of (Ω0) to 0.25, and then increase the value of
(Ω0) to 0.75. Overall, the results indicate that changes in the speed of wage adjustment lead to different
responses in the short run. In particular, a higher speed of adjustment has a stronger effect on relative
trade prices, which explains the fluctuation in unemployment and output.33 In contrast, a low speed
of wage adjustment has a small effect on the relative trade prices in the short run, which results in a
lower fluctuation. These result are not consistent with those of our benchmark model in the short run.
However, the response of the model in the long run is quite similar to our benchmark model.34
Figure 18: Unemployment rate
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Figure 19: GDP
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33As discussed earlier, a union with stronger bargaining power may not be so fast in reinforcing lower wages, in which
case this result might not hold. The purpose of these simulations is merely to test the sensitivity of the model.
34We test the response of the model by changing the key parameters in the consumption function. We find that our
results are quite robust to changes in these parameters.
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Figure 20: Unemployment rate
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Figure 21: GDP
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5.5 Discussion
The results from our simulations raise several questions on the economic gains of lower unemployment
benefits (UB) in a small open economy. We show that reductions in UB lead to a clear tension between
a fall in demand and a rise in net exports at a macro level. Our results demonstrate that a lower
compensation rate (i.e., lower UB) in a small open economy can compress demand but it may or may
not increase the level of competitiveness, depending on the level of real wage rigidity. If wages are rigid,
reductions in UB will negatively affect demand while the level of international price competitiveness will
not change to offset the effect of a demand compression. In contrast, if wages are flexible, reductions in
UB will result in lower real wages, which will improve the level of competitiveness. However, in this case
the gains from increased competitiveness are offset by a much stronger fall in demand due to a decrease
in the income of both employed and unemployed households. It is important to highlight that this result
may not be valid for profit–led economies, where the gains from increased competitiveness, in response
to a fall in wage shares, might be stronger than a fall in domestic demand. However, if resistance to real
wage reductions is stronger, then the economy may not benefit from a fall in the compensation rate, and
as a result the adverse effects of a fall in domestic demand are likely to be dominant, regardless of the
growth regime.
The negative effects of lower unemployment benefits on the income of unemployed households are
straight forward, i.e., a fall in the compensation rate directly decreases the income of unemployed house-
holds. On the other hand, the positive macro effects – e.g., a rise in net exports or a reduction in
unemployment rate – associated with unemployment benefits are not straight forward.
Focusing on the labour market, we demonstrated through our simulations that lowering unemploy-
ment benefits does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the unemployment rate in the long run. Our
results are in sharp contrast to the studies arguing that a reduction in UB decreases the unemployment
rate. There is a huge controversy regarding the effects of unemployment benefits on unemployment
rate. This issue is typically analysed within the framework of utility maximisation, where an increase in
unemployment benefits has a direct effect on the motivation of the individual to work. A fundamental
flaw in the standard models is the exclusive focus on the economic incentive to work while ignoring other
social aspects. As described by Van Staveren (2014), the decision whether to apply for a job or not
does not depend solely on wages or the loss of income, but a number of social factors. According to
Howell/Azizoglu (2011) and Forges Davanzati (2014), the loss of income is only a small part of the total
cost of unemployment – personal costs of unemployment often exceed the economic costs. Larsen (2009)
shows that in a majority of studies, non–economic factors increase the incentive to work amongst unem-
ployed individuals. The non–economic factors, e.g., institutional norms, where unemployed people may
be afraid of stigmatization and the need for an identity (workwise) and social belonging are especially
strong in Denmark compared to the rest of the world (Larsen, 2009).
The recent developments in the Danish labour market, which reduced the level and duration of UB,
accompanied by a tightening of the eligibility criteria for benefits, are elements of a pro-capital policy as
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described in Lavoie/Stockhammer (2013). The outcome of such a policy can be very damaging for the
flexicurity system and the economy in the long run. From the point of view of the Danish labour market,
the tightening of unemployment benefits leads to a fall in the income security of the workers. This
may affect the interest that the unions have in accommodating the flexible nature of the labour market,
specifically the flexibility in hiring and firing workers without any compensation. If so, both the flexibility
and security aspects of the flexibility model are weakened, which can generate a less dynamic labour
market. Another major concern, as pointed out by Lavoie/Stockhammer (2013), is that a pro-capital
distribution policy in a wage-led economy leads to dampened growth, unless the effects are offset by
other factors such as debt. In this regard, the Danish economy reveals some interesting statistics worth
highlighting; Danish households increased their stock of gross debt from 160% of disposable income in
1995 to around 300% in 2010. At the same time, the Danish trade balance has been in a surplus; net
exports have mostly been positive since 1995. Hence, it can be argued that the adverse effects of a falling
welfare and wage shares on demand have been mitigated by a rise in private debt – a feature shared by
many advanced economies.
For a moment, even if we accept the argument that a change in the compensation rate has an effect
on the incentive to work, a natural question that follows is, can an increase in the incentive to work
automatically generate employment? Our framework clearly deviates from the traditional assumption
of linking employment to the utility maximisation problem of workers. In our framework, the level of
employment is determined by the level of effective demand in the goods market. The supply of labour
is not constrained by the incentive to work, and the compensation rate has no effect on the utility of
workers but on the terms of union wage–bargaining. The aggregate effects on unemployment are thus a
result of the macroeconomic impact and feedback effects of altering sectoral income and competitiveness,
rather than the simplistic aggregation of a microeconomic behavioural assumption.
6 Conclusion
The effect of unemployment benefits has been at the centre of both political and economic discussions
for the last few decades. According to the political argument, a high level of unemployment benefits
affects the incentive to work, and people therefore choose to stay unemployed instead of applying for low–
paid jobs. This line of reasoning is backed by a large strand of economic literature, where substitution
and income effects are used as an explanation for the choice of whether to work or not. Within this
framework, a decrease in the compensation rate leads to an increase in the labour supply, and thereby
to an increase in the level of employment.
This paper explored the macroeconomic effects of unemployment benefits within the framework of
a simple SFC model for a small open economy. We create three main scenarios: In the first scenario,
we reduce the rate of compensation which immediately increases the rate of unemployment due to a
fall in domestic demand. In the medium term however, the unemployment rate falls due to an increase
in competitiveness and net exports. This short run to medium run response of the model is consistent
with the (ADAM, 2013) model for Denmark. In the long run however, our story diverges from the
short run results: a reduction in the rate of compensation leads to a permanent increase in the rate of
unemployment as demand compression dominates the dynamics of the system. In the second and third
scenarios, the prevailing story in the standard economic literature is further challenged. In scenario 2,
when we introduce downward real wage rigidity, a lower compensation rate leads to an increase in the
rate of unemployment both in the short run and long run. A lower compensation rate in this scenario
has a very minor impact on the competitiveness as real wages are resistant to falls. In the third scenario,
the elasticity of a change in the rate of employment on targeted wages is lowered, i.e., the wage Phillips-
curve becomes relatively flatter. In this scenario, a reduction in the unemployment benefits shows similar
results to the case of scenario 1. Overall, our results clearly suggest that reduced compensation does
not necessarily reduce the unemployment rate. In contrast, we find that a lower compensation rate can
increase the rate of unemployment, depending on the magnitude of a fall in demand.
Our conclusion – although in sharp contrast with several studies – finds some support in the literature.
The critiques of the prevailing belief, such as Howell/Rehm (2009), have argued that the utility of workers
is largely irrelevant for unemployment benefits. Frey/Stutzer (2002) find a positive relationship between
employment and happiness. Moreover, it has been argued that the link between unemployment benefits
and labour supply is not as obvious as is often stated in economic theory, and the decision to supply
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labour relies not only on financial motivations but also on social and institutional norms. Another critical
point is that an increase in the labour supply does not automatically result in an increase in employment,
as is implied by the arguments related to disincentive effects. We show that the level of employment is
determined by effective demand in the goods market. This implies that unemployment is a demand–led
problem, and not a function of high real wages or high unemployment benefits as is widely believed in
the existing economic literature. The model we present in no way claims to have resolved this issue, but
it reveals that the link between unemployment benefits and unemployment rates is more complicated
than the type of treatment it has received in the existing literature. The results from our simulations
show that a variety of scenarios are possible.
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Appendix
Behavioural equations
FIRMS
National income
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +Xt −Mt (18)
Sales
St = Ct + It +Gt +Xt (19)
Value of real output
yt = st −mt (20)
GDP deflator
P yt = Yt/yt (21)
Price of sales
P st = (1 + φ).(UCt) (22)
Unit Cost
UCt = (WBt +Mt)/st (23)
Domestic sales price
P dst =
St −Xt
st − xt
(24)
Real sales
st = ct + gt + it + xt (25)
Nominal value of sales
St = st.P
s
t (26)
Real investment
it = γ.(k
T − kt−1) + da (27)
Targeted stock of capital
kT = µ.st−1 (28)
Depreciation of capital
da = δ.st−1 (29)
Change in stock of capital
∆kt = it − da (30)
Nominal value of investment
It = it.P
ds
t (31)
Supply of equity
es = est−1 + χ.∆k (32)
Profit of the firms
Ff = St −Mt −WBt − T ft (33)
Retained profits
Fr = I + ∆H
f − ∆es.P e (34)
Distributed profits
Fh = Ff − Fr (35)
Demand for domestic currency
Hft = H
f
t−1 +Xt −Mt (36)
Taxes of the firms
T ft = θ.
(
Yt −WBt
)
(37)
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HOUSEHOLDS
Households disposable income
Y Dt = WBt + rt−1.B
h
t−1 + UB + Fh − Tht (38)
Taxes paid by the households
T ft = θ.
(
WBt + rt−1(B
h
t−1) + UB
)
(39)
Real disposable income
ydt =
Y Dt
P dst
−
vt−1.(∆P ds)
P dst
(40)
Wealth accumulation
Vt = Vt−1 + Y Dt − Ct (41)
Real wealth
vt = Vt/P
ds
t (42)
Real consumption
ct = α1.ydt + α2.vt−1 (43)
Nominal consumption
Ct = ct.P
ds
t (44)
Demand for bills
Bht = Vt.
(
λ0 + λ1.(rt) − λ2.(Y Dt/Vt)
)
(45)
Demand for equity
ed = es (46)
Demand for domestic currency
Hht = Vt −Bht − ed.P e (47)
GOVERNMENT
Tax revenue
Tt = T
f
t + T
h
t (48)
Supply of government bills
BSt = BSt−1 +Gt + UBt + rt−1.BSt−1 − Tt − rt−1.B
cb
t−1 (49)
CENTRAL BANK:
Government bills held by the Central bank
Bcbt = BSt −B
h
t (50)
Demand for foreign currency, i.e., the foreign currency reserves generated by the the surplus on trade
Fx = Fxt−1 +
(
∆Hft
XR
)
where
(
XR =
∆Hft
∆Fxt
= 1
)
is implicit in the model (51)
Supply of currency by the Central bank
HSt = HSt−1 +B
cb
t −Bcbt−1 +H
f
t −H
f
t−1 (52)
LABOUR MARKET:
Employment
Nt = yt/At (53)
Wage bill
WBt = Wt.Nt (54)
Unemployment
UNt = Lft −Nt (55)
Unemployment benefits
UBt = ξ.Wt.UNt (56)
Employment rate
ERt =
Nt
Lft
(57)
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Unemployment rate
URt = 1 −
Nt
Lft
(58)
Labour force
Lf = act.Pop (59)
where Pop is the total population
Labour participation rate
ln(act) = Φ0 + Φ1.ln
(
Wt
P dst
)
+ Φ2.ln(ERt−1) (60)
Nominal wage rate
Wt = Wt−1 + Ω0.(w
∗
t−1 − wt−1) (61)
Real wage
wt =
Wt
P dst
(62)
Targeted wage rate
lnw∗ = β0 + β1.ln(At) + β2.ln(ξ) + β3.ln(ERt−1) (63)
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND TRADE
Import prices
ln(Pmt ) = νm0 + νm1 .ln(P
y∗
t ) + (1 − νm1 ).ln(P
y
t ) + νm1 .ln(XR) (64)
Export prices
ln(Pxt ) = νx0 + νx1 .ln(P
y∗
t ) + (1 − νx1 ).ln(P
y
t ) + νx1 .ln(XR) (65)
where XR is the nominal exchange rate, which is fixed to 1 in our model.
Real imports
ln(mt) = µ0 − µ1.ln
(
Pmt−1
P yt−1
)
+ µ2.ln(yt) (66)
Real exports
ln(xt) = ε0 − ε1.ln
(
Pxt−1
P y
∗
t−1
)
+ ε2.ln(y
∗
t ) (67)
Nominal imports
Mt = mt.P
m (68)
Nominal exports
Xt = xt.P
x (69)
Current account balance
CABt = Xt −Mt (70)
Financial account balance
FABt = −∆Fx.XR (71)
ASSET MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Total demand and supply of bills
BSt︸︷︷︸
Bills issued
= Bht +B
cb
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bills demanded
(72)
Total demand and supply for domestic currency
HSt︸︷︷︸
Currency issued
= Hht +H
f
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Currency demanded
(73)
Total demand and supply for foreign currency
Fx∗t︸︷︷︸
Fx issued
= Fxt︸︷︷︸
Fx demanded
(74)
Parameter and exogenous variables
θ = 0.2 Ω0 = 0.5 β0 = -0.15 β1 =1 β2= 0.1 β3 = 0.75 α1 = 0.9 α2 = 0.1
λ0 = 0.65 λ1 = 5 λ2 = 0.01 r = 0.025 γ = 0.15 ξ = 0.55 µ = 1 δ=0.1
νm1 = 0.7 νx1 = 0.4 µ2 = 1.11 ε0= 0.917 ε1 = 1.6 ε2= 0.62 Φ = 0.186 Φ0 = -0.2646
Φ1= 0.05 Φ2 = 0.23 χ =0.10 Pop = 117.4 A = 1.05 g = 14.72 XR = 1 P
y∗ = 1
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